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In this chapter we will see how string theory contains some surprising symmetries – ‘dualities’ –
which, we will argue, put pressure on the view that the spacetime in which strings are described can
be literally identified with classical, physical spacetime – instead it is ‘emergent’ from the theory.
While the following stands on the previous chapter, and exemplifies its physics, it can be read on
its own to understand the essential conclusions. We focus on one such symmetry, ‘T-duality’, but
at the end review others.
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1 T-duality
Consider a closed, classical bosonic string in Minkowski spacetime with a compact spatial dimension,
x, of radius R.1 As we saw in the previous chapter, its state is a function X(σ, τ) describing the
x-coordinate of the point of the string worldsheet with worldsheet coordinates (σ, τ): hence the
state of a string specifies an embedding of the worldsheet into spacetime.
w=1
w=3
Figure 1: Two closed strings in a 2-dimensional space with one compact dimension. One string
is wrapped once around x, and the other three times – with winding numbers w = 1 and w = 3,
respectively.
We adopt the conventions that the spacelike string coordinate σ is periodic with period π, while
the compact spatial coordinate x is periodic with period 2π (so that σ and σ + nπ are labels for
the same point of the string worldsheet, and x and x+ 2nπ are labels for the same point of space).
Then the state of the string with respect to x is
X(σ, τ) = 2wσR+ 2`2spτ + vibrational terms. (7.1)
This expression differs from equation (6.6) by the addition of the first term, which describes the
w-fold winding of the string: for instance, if the string is wound once around x, so w = 1, then X
ranges from 0 to 2π as σ ranges from 0 to π. The second term represents the linear momentum
of the string; the constant `s is the ‘characteristic string length’. For simplicity, we shall ignore
vibrations, since they do not change the substance of this chapter.2
In wisely chosen string coordinates (and suitable units), substituting X in the Hamiltonian
(6.20) gives
1Our technical presentation follows, amongst others, Brandenberger and Vafa (1989), Greene (1999, 237),
Zwiebach (2004, Ch 17), and Zaslow (2008). The treatment given here uses an approximation based on the ‘double
field theory’ approach (see e.g., Aldazabal et al. (2013)).
2Important: to clean up expressions in this chapter, we rescale `S by a factor of 1/
√
2, and, in (7.2), T by a factor
of π/4, relative to chapter 6. Though there is a small risk of confusion arising, we believe this decision makes this
chapter more accessible to those reading it without studying the previous chapter. These unconventional changes
have no physical significance; indeed, one could have achieved most of the same result by trivially rescaling the
worldsheet coordinate.
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H =
T
8π
∫
Ẋ2 +X ′2 dσ =
T
2π
∫
(`2sp)
2 + (wR)2 dσ, (7.2)
where T is another constant, the string tension. Not surprisingly there is a kinetic term, plus a
term from the winding, hence stretching, of the string around the closed dimension. The next step
is to quantize.
Momentum first. The closed dimension implies a periodic boundary condition for momentum
eigenstates Ψk(x) = e
ikx (ignoring normalization, and with ~ = 1)
Ψk(0) = Ψk(2πR)⇒ eik·0 = 1 = eik·2πR ⇒ k = 0,±1/R,±2/R . . . . (7.3)
In other words, momentum is quantized: |k| = n/R, with ‘wave number’ n. Substituting into the
Hamiltonian (7.2), we obtain the spectrum
En,w =
T
2π
∫
(`2sn/R)
2 + (wR)2 dσ. (7.4)
Now winding. Assuming interactions, in QM a string can change the number of times it is
wound around a closed dimension. Hence w is not a constant, classical ‘c-number’ of the system,
but a dynamical quantum quantity, described by a wavefunction. Pay close attention to this point,
as it is crucial : because the winding number can change over time, a quantum string can be in
superposition of states of different winding numbers. Without this move there is no T-duality – in
this sense it is a quantum phenomenon.
The winding term in (7.2) depends on l = wR, which must have a discrete spectrum since
w does. Thus much as before, these eigenstates have the form Φl(y) = e
ily around a circle with
coordinate y, but with radius 1/R.3 In that case the periodic boundary condition Φl(0) = Φl(2π/R)
yields
eil·0 = 1 = eil·2π/R ⇒ l = 0,±R,±2R, · · · = wR, (7.5)
as required. Overall then, the state of a quantum string involves (the tensor product of) two
wavefunctions, one representing its position/momentum, and another representing its winding.
The question is of course, ‘where is the circle on which the Φl(y) wavefunction lives?’ It can’t just
be in space, because then Φl(y) describes a second object which we could expect to find somewhere.
Instead, there must be a new ‘internal’ dimension associated with each closed dimension of space;
hence Witten calls y ‘another “direction” peculiar to string theory’ (Witten 1996, 29). His proposal
is not that space has an extra dimension for every dimension a string can wrap around, but rather
that treating winding as a quantum observable means that it can be represented like momentum on
a non-spatial circle. Or more precisely, when we consider the space of all states of any momentum or
winding, we find two quantum ‘position’ operators, x and y, respectively corresponding to position
in physical space (radius R) and in a new ‘winding space’ (radius 1/R). But observables represent
physical quantities, so we have to take both ‘positions’ and spaces equally seriously, even if only
one is physical space; let’s call the other ‘winding space’. But remember, the string winds around
physical space, while the winding number wave lives in winding space. (Take the term ‘physical
space’ with a grain of salt here: it is the space in which the string moves, but precisely because
3This quantity seems to have units of length−1, but the numerator can be taken as an area to give overall correct
units. A similar point applies everywhere that quantities appear to have the wrong units.
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of T-duality we will have to clarify below exactly how it relates to ordinary, observable, classical
space.)
Semi-technical aside: as usual, x and y are ‘position’ operators for physical and winding
space. Moreover, as p̂ = −i∂/∂x is the momentum observable with eigenvalues k = n/R
in the periodic plane wave states einx/R, so ŵ = −i∂/∂y is the winding observable with
eigenvalues l = wR in the winding states eiwRy. Thus each space is associated with identical
canonical commutation relations, [x̂, p̂] = i and [ŷ, ŵ] = i (the observables from different
spaces commute). Therefore, since position and momentum generate the algebra of ob-
servables, each space has, formally speaking, exactly the same observables, individuated as
functions of x and p̂ or y and ŵ.4
Such ‘internal’ spaces are familiar – for spin states and gauge field states, for instance – so there
is nothing new yet. But look again at (7.4), the spectrum of the Hamiltonian. It’s easy to check
that a string with wave number n and winding number w in a space with radius R has the same
energy eigenvalue as a string with winding number n and wave number w, but which lives in a space
of radius `2s/R:
n↔ w and R→ `2s/R. (7.6)
The second string has a spatial wavefunction in a compact dimension of radius `2s/R, and hence
– by the same reasoning as before – a winding wavefunction that lives in a compact dimension of
reciprocal radius, namely R/`2s. If the first string lives in a space with radius R > `s, then the
second string lives in a space of radius `2s/R < `s: the strings are ‘reflected’ through `s. See figure
2.
Now, n and w label eigenstates of momentum and winding, and so in terms of wavefunctions,
n ↔ w corresponds to Ψn(x) → Φw(x) and Φw(y) → Ψn(y): the wavefunctions are exchanged
between space and winding space. Thus for general spatial and winding wavefunctions (i.e., su-
perpositions of momentum or winding eigenstates) Ψ(x) and Φ(y), respectively, let Ψ(x) → Φ(x)
and Φ(y) → Ψ(y): the ‘dual’ string has the same – but exchanged – wavefunctions. (And if we
took account of the vibrations of the string, these would also be exchanged between physical and
winding spaces.)
Then, (i) because they have the same Hamiltonian, both strings will have the same mass spec-
trum (because in string theory the Hamiltonian determines the mass: see equation 6.36). Moreover,
(ii) because the roles of momentum and winding are reversed in the Hamiltonian by (7.6), the dy-
namics of the spatial wavefunction in one string become the dynamics of the winding wavefunction
in the other, and vice versa: in other words, the strings remain dual over time under the exchange
of momentum and winding.
Further, (iii) because momentum and winding are exchanged by (7.6), every observable per-
taining to physical space is exchanged with a corresponding observable pertaining to winding space;
and because the wavefunctions are also exchanged, the expectation value of the new observable for
the dual string will equal that of the original observable for the original string. (And vice versa.)
In short, the pattern of observable quantities will be preserved by (7.6); what changes is whether
4Of course there are observables involving operators from both the spaces, but since the latter commute, such
observables are always the commutative product of a pair of observables, one from each space. So all the points we
need go through trivially, and we will ignore them.
6In the next section we will see that the label ‘space’ should be replaced with ‘target space’.
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space
wavenumber n wavenumber w
wavenumber nwavenumber w
Theory 1
Theory 2
winding space
Ψ(x) Φ(y)
Φ(x) Ψ(y)
R 1/R
ℓ2/R R/ℓ2
Figure 2: Reading horizontally first, Theory 1 describes a string moving in a space x of radius R
with wavenumber n – more generally, with wavefunction Ψ(x); and winding described by the wave
number w – more generally, wavefunction Φ(y) – in a ‘winding space’ y with reciprocal radius, 1/R.
Now reading vertically, a second, ‘dual’ theory is obtained by simultaneously taking R→ `2/R and
n↔ w (equivalently, Ψ↔ Φ).6
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the quantity is understood to pertain to physical or to winding space.7 (And similarly once one
includes the vibrations of the string.)
Continuation of the semi-technical aside: a little more formally, the point is that the algebra
of observables on spatial wavefunctions for one string is mapped onto the identical (as we
saw above) algebra of observables on winding wavefunctions of the other – with x ↔ y
and p̂ ↔ ŵ. Since the wavefunctions are also exchanged, the values associated with all
corresponding elements of the algebra of observables are preserved by (7.6) – the entire
pattern of expectation values. (But generally not the expectation values of specific operators.)
Thus the systems are equivalent in the following sense: the Hamiltonian and hence dynamics are
the same, and the pattern of physical quantities (formally represented by observables) agree. This
equivalence, and others comparably strong, are known as ‘dualities’, and (as implicitly anticipated)
the two theories related by it are ‘dual’ to each other, or ‘duals’.8 In particular, (7.6) is known
as ‘T-duality’, where – depending on whom you ask – ‘T’ either stands for ‘target space’ (i.e., the
space in which the string lives), or for ‘torus’. T-duality holds not only for the bosonic string just
considered, but also for supersymmetric string theory, in which case it also changes the character
of the string: for instance, type IIA strings are T-dual to type IIB strings.
There is a lot to unpack and justify in these statements, which will be the work of the following
section, but for now a concrete example, taken from Brandenberger and Vafa (1989), will help
illustrate some of its implications. Take T-duals, T1 and T2, which differ in the radius that they
postulate for a closed spatial dimension: a circumference of 1012 light years (two orders of magnitude
bigger than the visible universe) on the one hand, and 10−94m on the other (assuming a value for
the characteristic string length of 10−33m, two orders of magnitude above the Planck length). Thus
T1 and T2 (apparently) make radically different assertions about the size of a spatial dimension.
Before T-duality, one would assume that simple observations would rather readily choose between
them, but that can’t be right if the duals are physically equivalent.
To understand how the equivalence manifests itself, in a beautiful conceptual analysis, Bran-
denberger and Vafa consider an archetypical measurement of the radius: fire off a particle of known
velocity – a photon, say – and time its journey around space. Suppose the result is a trillion years:
that seems pretty conclusive evidence for the large radius story, T1. But, in terms of T1, how is the
measurement described? The photon has a spatial wavefunction ψ(x, t), which evolves, according
to the Hamiltonian, from being localized nearby, via a journey away of 1012 years, to being localized
nearby again. However, T2 can also account for this result.
Note that the photon is a low energy mode of the string, the easiest thing to excite. Indeed,
using the Planck tension of about 1044N as an estimate of the string tension, we find that in T1
the first excited winding state corresponds to the mass-energy of 1015 supermassive black holes; so
‘low’ energy here is relative to almost inconceivable scales! On the other other hand k = n/R, so
momentum is inverse to the radius of space, and the very large radius of space in T1 allows states of
very low momentum, hence of low energy. In other words, in T1 the low (by any sensible measure)
7The mapping introduces a `2s factor, but these can be absorbed in a trivial rescaling of observables, so we will
ignore it.
8There are competing accounts of what exactly makes a symmetry a ‘duality’ (or even a ‘symmetry’). We have in
mind an account along the lines of that given in de Haro (2020), which aligns with our interpretative goals. This sense
may not align perfectly with traditional use of the term, nor (according to Dawid (2017)) its novel methodological
meaning for string theorists. See also De Haro (2019).
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energy photon used to measure the circumference has a state involving only momentum excitation,
and the lowest, w = 0, winding state.
But in T2, with reciprocal spatial radius, even the smallest excitation has tiny wavelength and
sohuge momentum, while the energy of stretching a string around a dimension of radius 10−94m
is tiny (about a tenth of the electron mass). Thus in T2 the (same) low energy photon in the
experiment is described by winding modes, and the lowest, k = 0 momentum state. And of course
the states are indeed dual: a T1 momentum state maps to a T2 winding state, the former with
wave number, and the latter with winding number, n. Thus, according to T2 the photon has the
dual state represented by the same wavefunction ψ(y, t) but in winding space. Then, because the
Hamiltonian is the same, but with the roles of physical and winding space reversed, the photon
evolves in exactly the same way – namely a ‘journey’ around winding space, taking 1012 years, as
observed. No surprise there: in T2 physical space is tiny, hence winding space, with reciprocal radius
is huge. (Of course, from the point of view of physical space, the evolving winding wavefunction
describes some changing superposition of states in which the string is wound different numbers of
times around the tiny radius.)
This analysis shows that because the experiment is characterized as timing a low energy particle
(of a given type), by construction it involves a process in the larger of physical and winding space,
and so is guaranteed to take a long time, guaranteed to produce the phenomena of a large radius
space in either dual. (Indeed, because they are dual, the process is guaranteed to take the same
time, be an observation of the same large radius.)
And the equivalence generalizes. Any process in physical and winding space according to T1,
corresponds to a process in T2 in winding and physical space, and so no measurements or observa-
tions of even the most hypothetical kind will distinguish them. And so, the question comes up of
which we should take to be correct; or indeed, whether the difference between tiny and huge is a
true physical one at all. In the next section we will review some responses to this situation, and
give reasons to favor one.
At this point we want to acknowledge that assuming that physical states supervene on expec-
tation values is to take a strong stance on the interpretation of QM. For instance, that assumption
is clearly false according to Bohm’s theory. Moreover, Nikolić (2007) has shown that Bohmian
string theory breaks T-duality as a symmetry. While we take the Bohmian view very seriously, in
this discussion we will explore the consequences of duality for interpretations in which there are no
‘hidden’ variables.
2 T-duality and the nature of space in string theory
Having explained T-duality in the previous section, we now turn to unpacking its significance for
the nature of space in string theory (and by extension, the possible significance of other dualities).
In §2.1 we will lay out different ways in which one might take a duality. We will consider two
interpretational forks: first, whether, despite appearances, duals are physically equivalent, in fact
representing the same physical states of affairs; or whether they are inequivalent, but equally
compatible with any observation. Second, we will see that the way that the duals represent makes
a difference to what the state of affairs on which they agree is – what, that is, they say about
spacetime.9 Then we turn to deciding which interpretational choices are best: we argue in §2.2 for
9Note that Matsubara (2013), Read (2014), and Le Bihan and Read (2018) provide alternative complementary
categorizations of the stances on duality, useful in the context of different background philosophical issues. Dieks
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the physical equivalence of the duals, and in §2.4 that the duals describe strings living in a space
of no determinate radius – the main conclusion of this chapter.
2.1 Interpretive questions
T-duality provides a mapping (7.6) between a pair of theories that agree (under the mapping) on
the expectation values of all observables in all states, and on the evolutions of all states.
Note that there is a mismatch between the philosophers’ and the physicists’ use of ‘theory’ at
this point. Roughly, physicists distinguish theories by the mathematical form of the laws (or action),
while philosophers often further distinguish them by the values of their constants. In physicists’
but not philosophers’ terms, T-duals are the same theory, but there is no substantive disagreement
about the facts. We have decided to follow philosophers’ sense of ‘theory’ here, because it will
facilitate the following discussion to emphasize the differences between the duals. We however
follow the physicists in describing T-duality, and other dualities in which the laws take the same
form in the duals, as ‘self-dualities’. (Later we will describe ‘holographic duality’, which is not a
self-duality.)
It’s also important to emphasize that ‘observables’ here does not have any narrow philosophical
empiricist meaning: it denotes the collection of hermitian operators (subject to any selection rules),
not some ‘special’ collection of properties to which we have especially ‘direct’ access. Indeed, the
observables are thus those operators normally thought of as representing the totality of physical,
quantum mechanical quantities, including those far from immediate ‘observation’ by humans. And
with respect to those quantities the theories are – under the mapping – in perfect agreement.
The qualifier ‘under the mapping’ is crucial. Prima facie, in one system a string has momentum
n/R, and is wound w times around a dimension of radius R. In the other, it has momentum Rw/`2s
and is wound n times around a dimension of radius R′ ≡ `2s/R. And in the quantum mechanical
treatment spatial and winding-spatial parts of the wavefunction are interchanged: Ψ(x)⊗ Φ(y)→
Φ(x)⊗Ψ(y) (which, in the case of simultaneous momentum and winding eigenstates, entails n↔ w).
If the physical interpretation of the operators is held fixed, then the theories are inequivalent. So
the crucial question will be that of their interpretation.
Normally also one thinks of c-numbers such as R as physical, in which case duals again describe
different physical situations. But normally, c-number parameters can be determined by the values of
quantum quantities: the charge on the electron, say, by scattering probabilities. A duality arguably
means they cannot be so determined by the values of the observables of the theory: the pattern
of expectation values is preserved. So we should at least leave open that such differences in the
c-numbers do not, after all, represent physical differences. In §2.2, invoking a simple duality, we
will argue that indeed they do not. But for now we have our first interpretive decision: either the
T-duals agree on the physical world or they do not. If they do, then for the purposes of this enquiry
they say the same, all in; we will not be interested in any putative non-physical differences.
Most commentators have agreed that the T-duals should indeed be taken as giving the same
physical description: especially, see Dawid (2007), Matsubara (2013), Rickles (2011b), Rickles
(2013), and Vistarini (2019, chapter 3). However, there have been recent skeptical or dissenting
voices: especially, Read and Møller-Nielsen (2018), Weatherall (2019), and Butterfield (forthcom-
ing). We will argue below (§2.2) that physical equivalence is a reasonable conclusion, but we will
also clarify how this should be understood, and modify the position taken in Huggett (2015), in the
light of the more recent work. String theorists often seem to endorse physical equivalence of duals
et al. (2015) proposes a distinction similar to my second taxonomic fork.
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(for instance, Greene 1999, 247). However their words sometimes seem ambiguous on the point.
For instance, Teh (2013) identifies remarks suggesting that one dual may be more fundamental than
another10
, and an important point made by Harlow and reported at the end of this chapter). However,
taking the view that duals are physically equivalent, a second interpretive decision awaits.11
To describe the options now facing us, it is first necessary to be more careful in distinguishing the
different conceptions of space that have entered the discussion. So far we have already distinguished
‘physical’ and ‘winding’ spaces, but to proceed we need to revise this division. First, the former
concept will be bifurcated. Second, it should be clear by now that winding space is every bit as
‘physical’ as ‘physical space’, so we will drop that terminology as misleading.
Instead we start from an analytical distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘phenomena’. That is, when
a new, more fundamental scientific theory explains an established, less fundamental theory, which
has stood the test of experiment, then we can speak of the latter as the ‘phenomena’ relative to the
former. Being relative, the distinction is suited for the historical process by which today’s novel
‘theory’ becomes experimentally vindicated, and eventually becomes tomorrow’s bedrock empirical
given: Kepler’s laws were phenomena for Newton’s, but the laws Newton inferred from them were
themselves phenomena for general relativity.12 In the present case, the more fundamental theory is
string theory, which aims to explain, amongst other things, our current account of space. This ac-
count is expressed in our current best scientific theories, quantum field theory and general relativity,
in the small (high energy physics) and large (cosmology). All of these are the ‘phenomena’ relative
to string theory. In Huggett (2015) the space that they describe was thus called ‘phenomenal’;
however, this term has suggested to some the mental content of spatial experience rather than a
physical structure, so in this book we have used the terms ‘classical’, or ‘relativistic’, or ‘observed’,
or plain ‘space’ instead. Under this concept we also include the looser prescientific geometrical
space we take ourselves to observe in the everyday, including the experience of three large dimen-
sions. (Of course, quantum field theory, general relativity, and everyday experience describe space
in strictly incompatible ways: flat and curved, relativistic and not. But the relations between these
descriptions, especially as limits of each other, are well-enough understood to make the notion of a
single classical space, described by these phenomenal theories, clear enough for our purposes.)
In contrast, any ‘space’ that appears in the formulation of string theory is ‘theoretical’ in the
sense described. There are in fact two theoretical spaces in (quantum) string theory: the first, of
course, is winding space. The second is the space in which strings (and their momentum wave-
functions) live, which in the previous section we equated with classical space, under the concept of
‘physical space’. But, according to the theory-phenomena distinction, classical space is a ‘phenom-
enal’ physical space, while strings live in a ‘theoretical’ physical space. The ultimate question of
this section is of the relation between these two spaces, whether they are identical, or whether one
is reducible in some sense to the other. To clarify that investigation we thus adopt a new term –
‘target space’ – for the latter, the space in which strings propagate. (There are two reasons not to
use ‘physical space’ for this theoretical notion: first, as noted all three of the concepts of space we
have discussed are ‘physical’ in a general sense; second, on one interpretation of T-duality, target
10See also Read and Møller-Nielsen. However, we will discuss in §3.2 a sense in which relative fundamentality does
play a role in holographic duality.
11We want to thank Dave Baker for emphasizing that there are distinct options here.
12It is not essential for the reader to accept this historical picture. It’s helpful to accept a theory-phenomenon
distinction, which has its origins in Cartwright (1983, 1-19) and Bogen and Woodward (1988). What we take from
them is the idea that ‘phenomena’ are abstracted from direct observation events, and so have a ‘theoretical’ structure
themselves: We then add that a theory might therefore be phenomenal relative to a more fundamental theory.
9
space will turn out to have novel features, and the novel name will avoid the inapt connotations
that would come with a pre-existing concept.) ‘Target space’ is a term of art in string theory,
referring to the ‘background’ space in which a string is embedded: by the function X(σ, τ). The
classical string is literally located in target space, and wound around it; we will take it that it makes
sense to extend this intuitive picture to the quantum string, which thus also ‘lives’ in a background
target space. As we have formulated the theory in this chapter, this situation is represented by
the string’s position/momentum wavefunction being a function over target space: just as we rep-
resent a quantum particle being ‘in’ a region by a non-zero wavefunction over that region. It is
natural when first introduced to string theory, to think that target space is simply the same space
we ordinarily experience, or at least space as conceived in contemporary physics: T-duality makes
this identification problematic. Hence figure 2 should be modified, with ‘space’ replaced by ‘target
space’.
Given that general relativity and quantum field theory (and our everyday understanding) are
the context of phenomenal space, measurements of its radius are operationalized in their terms:
as in Brandenberger and Vafa’s thought experiment, for example, which appeals to the photons
and clocks of extant physics. Thus the radius of classical space, as defined, is given by c times the
duration of the photon’s journey. In terms of such measurements, classical space is observed to be
very large: we don’t know its radius (or even whether it is compact), but we can observe 1010 light
years of it – and even a simple glance around the room shows that it is much larger than 10−33m!13
Moreover, we have also seen how the dual theories will both predict that empirical result. While
giving dual descriptions of the photon experiment – one in a target space of the same radius as
classical space, and one in a target space with the reciprocal radius – they will agree on its duration,
and hence on the observed radius of space. Clearly we cannot immediately infer that target space
and classical space are one and the same; the remainder of the section explores this situation.
At the start of this section we made our first interpretive decision (to be justified in the next
section): we decided that dual theories state the same physical facts. Now that we have clearly dis-
tinguished three concepts of space – classical, target and winding – we are in a position to describe
a second interpretive decision, which presents a dichotomy.
Interpretation One: Suppose that the radius of space has been measured, by the Brandenberger
and Vafa experiment say, and found to be very large. Consider a theory, T , that sets R, the radius
of the x-dimension, equal to this observed radius. One can then understand T in a naively realist
way: take x to represent target space, take the string position/momentum wavefunction Ψ(x, t) to
represent a string living in target space, and identify target and classical space. That’s a natural
way to interpret the theory. But then how is one to understand the dual theory, T ′, which we
are taking to state the very same physical facts as T? For instance, T and T ′ apparently assign
different radii to target space, and (for w 6= n) apparently assert that the string is wound a different
number of times around target space: aren’t these physically different states of affairs? A solution
is to take the duality mapping as specifying a translation manual. From (7.6), in the dual theory,
let ‘n’ denote the winding number, not wave number, and ‘w’ denote the wave number, so that
momentum and winding are unchanged! And while in T the x-dimension represents target space
and the y-dimension winding-space, in T ′ the roles are reversed, so the same wavefunctions pertain
13In fact we will count any additional ‘small’, dimensions also as ‘classical’: though they may be required by
certain theories of quantum gravity, their possibility is not at all quantum mechanical, as the original Kaluza-Klein
theories demonstrate. Even though they are microscopic relative to the ordinary dimensions, they may still have a
large radius on the relevant scale, R > `s.
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to each space as before; and we again identify target and classical spaces so that in T ′ it is y,
not x, that represents classical space. Finally, as we saw earlier, within each theory the x- and
y-dimensions have reciprocal radii, so in T ′ the radius of the y-dimension is R/`2s: if we understand
T ′ to involve a rescaling of length units by a (dimensionless) factor of 1/`2s, then the duals even
agree on the radius of target space.14 In short, according to this interpretation, duals only appear
to be incompatible because they are written in different languages, assigning different meanings to
the same words: for example, they appear to assign different radii to target space, but only because
they denote different things by ‘target space’.
In the framework of first order logic, in this understanding T-duals are related by a permuta-
tion of terms that induces a different formal interpretation with respect to a domain with a fixed
structure, rather than any change in the domain referred to by those terms. That is, if predicate
symbols ‘P ’ and ‘Q’ have extensions A and B, respectively, in one interpretation, then in the other
they have extensions B and A, respectively; and no changes of any other kind.15
However, such a permutation is trivially possible for any theory with more than one term (of the
same kind), so we are left with the question of what distinguishes a (self-)duality from an arbitrary
permutation? This question was asked in Huggett (2015) (and recently pressed in (Weatherall 2019,
§4)). The answer suggested there was, roughly, that some theorems, including those whose terms
have antecedent empirical significance, are preserved by the duality. For instance, in Brandenberger
and Vafa’s thought experiment both duals agree on the energy of the particle observed, and the
duration of the trajectory: in general, as far as the experiment is described in operational terms,
the duals agree on the facts.
The significance of the invariance of claims stated in terms with antecedent empirical meaning
can be brought out by the following example (from Motl (2015)). Consider that if one permutes
the meanings of the terms ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, then in the resulting language the Earth is hollow!
That is, the solid core is ‘outside’ the surface, and the sky and beyond ‘inside’ – there may well be
aliens living ‘inside’ the Earth! But we antecedently define the ‘outside’ as our direction from the
ground, or by the gravitational force, or as the direction of the fixed stars. And the consequence that
the moon is outside in that sense – in the same direction as the fixed stars, say – is not preserved
in the new language. On the contrary, the antecedently meaningful, including operational, claims
of string theory are common to both duals, so duality is not mere permutation.
Such invariance is non-trivial but, we now think, does not adequately answer the question of why
dualities are physically significant, for permutations of terms are just as trivial, even if some proper
part of the vocabulary is held fixed. However, we do not find such triviality as telling against this
interpretation of duality. Perhaps the correct understanding is that dualities are physically trivial,
and their significance purely formal. So our argument against the adequacy of this interpretation
of T-duality will come below, in §2.4.
Interpretation Two: The second understanding of duality – which we argue for in §2.4 – also
takes the dual theories as asserting all the same things about the physical world, but now under a
common interpretation of their terms. In this case what either says about the physical world must
be restricted to their ‘shared content’, in some sense: for instance, the mass spectrum of the string
is common to both and hence a physical fact. Similarly, as we saw, the duals predict the same time
14The factor is dimensionless because the numerator has units of length2. To see that this rescaling is trivial, note
that we could have simply have worked in units in which `s = 1, in which case no rescaling is necessary.
15For a duality that is not a self-duality, the reinterpretation would replace old terms with new ones, through a
‘translation manual’, rather than permute a fixed set of terms.
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for a photon to circle the universe: 1012 years, say. Since the radius of observed, classical space is
thus a shared consequence of the duals, it is a determinate, physical fact.
But the theories do not agree on the radius of target space, nor, as we saw, on what string
process corresponds to the photon measurement. Since in this interpretation the terms of the duals
denote all the same things, these disagreements are logical incompatibilities between them; and
then, because we are taking duals to agree on the physical facts, where the duals disagree, they do
not state physical facts. In particular, according to T target space has radius R, while according to
T ′, the radius is `2s/R. Thus according to ‘Interpretation Two’ there is no physical fact of the matter
which is correct, and with respect to these two values the radius of target space is indeterminate.
Similarly, it is indeterminate whether the string is wound w or n times around the dimension. And
so on.16
The question of the ‘shared content’ of duals is crucial. Huggett (2015) suggests that it be
understood as any common entailments of both duals. But T entails that target space has radius
R, and hence that it has a determinate radius; and T ′ entails that target space has radius `2s/R,
and hence also entails that it has a determinate radius. So that ‘target space has a determinate
radius’ is a common entailment, which contradicts the interpretation of duality that we are currently
pursuing! (van Fraassen 1980, 46f) makes essentially the same point about absolute motion, in an
argument against the ‘syntactic view’ of theories, as an adequate approach to the interpretation
of physical theories. Drawing the same conclusion here, the natural move is to a more ‘semantic’
view of shared content. Such a position has been worked out in detail in de Haro (2020) and
Butterfield (forthcoming). Leaving out the details, a theory is understood as a triple of formal
states, quantities, and dynamics; such a ‘bare’ abstract structure will generally be realized in a
more concrete mathematical framework; then symmetries in general, and duals in particular, are
cases of a common bare core theory, with different mathematical representations. We endorse this
account, in general terms and specifically, although (for reasons that will become clear later) view
it as an idealization in at least some of the cases of interest. (That is not a criticism: we generally
view philosophical theories in this way.) We shall return to the bearing of this framework on
physical equivalence, but to preview that discussion, the issue for a pair of duals will be whether
their differences in representation have physical content, or whether only their shared core does. In
the latter, but not former case they will be physically equivalent.
As argued in Huggett (2015), on this interpretation of duality, because the radius of target
space is indeterminate while that of classical space is determinate, it follows that classical space
is not identical with target space. (Similarly, it is not winding space either). Nothing can be both
determinate and indeterminate with respect to some property at once. Similarly, it follows that
we cannot think naively of strings as spatial objects, since there is no fact of the matter (even in
a quantum mechanical sense) of how many times they wrap around a dimension. And so on. As
Brandenberger and Vafa conclude (393), ‘the invariant notions of general relativity . . . may not be
invariant notions for string theory’.
If this position seems outré, that is only because of the surprising way in which it implements
perfectly ordinary considerations. Consider Newtonian mechanics: we know that the predictions of
the theory are the same whatever point we choose for the origin, whatever orientation we choose for
16Matsubara (2013, §6) argued along similar lines (as we did in Huggett and Wüthrich 2013), proposing (with
misgivings, but without elaboration) that the shared commitments of the duals be thought of as ‘structure’. However,
his account did not fully recognize the role of derived, classical space in the logic of the situation described in Huggett
(2015). The more recent discussion of Matsubara and Johansson (2018) clarifies this point, and is in agreement with
the conclusion of this chapter that (under the assumption of physical equivalence) the spaces of T-dual theories are
not strictly identical with classical space, but rather give rise to it.
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the axes, and indeed whatever constant state of motion we choose for the frame. And so we think
that there is no preferred ‘centre’, that space is isotropic, and that spacetime does not distinguish
a preferred state of rest. The fact that our coordinates do distinguish a point, break isotropy,
and give a notion of rest is quite clearly an artifact of the representation: inertial coordinates
make distinctions beyond those we wish to represent. The same understanding can apply to string
theory: T-duality shows that a definite radius for target space and a definite state of winding are
not physical, but only artifacts of the representation.
Classical space in this case is therefore derived, or ‘emergent’ from string theory, and in particu-
lar from the common core of its dual representations. Let us be very clear that classical space is not
‘unreal’ or ‘unphysical’ for that reason. There are well-known reasons to question the existence of
space, but being derived rather than fundamental is not one of them (though the sense in which it
approximates a more fundamental physics may bear on the debate). Space could be perfectly real
and perfectly physical, though not fundamental. In general, for all we know there is no ultimate the-
ory of everything, so that everything is derived from something more fundamental. If one insisted
that only the fundamental was ‘real’ then for all we know nothing is real – an absurdity, since we
know of many real things! How space is derived will be the subject of the next two chapters, but we
have already seen how one of its properties – its observed radius – can be understood in string theory.
So we have two interpretational forks. First, do the two theories describe the same physics, or
not? And second, if they do, should we take them literally, with the string living in phenomenal
space, and avoid incompatibilities by interpreting their terms differently? Or do they have the
same formal interpretation, in which case only their shared consequences are physical? We will
work through the first fork with a simple analogy in §2.2-2.3; then turn to the second fork in §2.4.
As we have said, we will argue that the duals are physically equivalent, and that some quantities –
such as the radius of target space – are not physically determinate.
2.2 Interpretation: physical equivalence?
If two theories are dual then under the duality the expectation values of all observables are preserved.
We emphasize that ‘observable’ here is used in its physical, quantum mechanical sense, not its
philosophical, epistemic sense. That is, observables are the correlates of the system’s hermitian
operators, generally understood to encompass all its dynamical physical quantities, and not merely
a proper subset to which we are thought to have privileged experiential access. In other words,
saying that ‘dual observables preserve expectation values’ does not signify that duals agree only
on the values of physical quantities visible to unaided senses, but may differ on those that are not:
‘observable’ means dynamical physical quantity without qualification, and certainly with no implied
epistemic privilege.
That understood, systems with dual descriptions need not be physically equivalent: as has often
been emphasized in the literature, a formal duality alone is not sufficient for physical equivalence.17
To explore this issue – and better understand the equivalence of expectation values – it is helpful
to look at duality in a very familiar system, a simple harmonic oscillator, such as a mass moving
horizontally and frictionlessly on a spring, described by the Hamiltonian
17For instance, Matsubara (2013), Huggett (2015), and de Haro (2020) all use the following harmonic oscillator
example to make the point.
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H =
p2
2m
+
kx2
2
, (7.7)
where p and x are momentum and displacement respectively, and m and k are mass spring constant
respectively. This oscillator is dual to another under the duality mapping
(m, k) ↔ (1/k, 1/m)
(x, p) ↔ (p,−x).18 (7.8)
(7.8) is in close analogy to (7.6); position and momentum are the analogues of winding and mo-
mentum, and mass and spring constant the analogues of the radius of space.
As for strings, the Hamiltonian and the canonical commutation relations are the same under
the duality (for the latter, [x, p] = [p,−x]). By the same logic then, the expectation values for all
pairs of dual observables agree, so that if any series of values of the quantities represented by dual
observables is consistent with either oscillator, then it is compatible with both. However, the dual
theories can clearly be used to describe two distinct concrete, physical oscillators in our world, one
with mass m, and one with mass 1/k (unless m = 1/k). No one questions that these would be dual,
but physically distinct oscillators. Nevertheless, in this subsection we argue (with many others)
that one should draw the opposite conclusion in the parallel case of T-duals differing in the radius
of space. We will explain why by further unpacking our example.
In particular, we need to consider carefully the measurements that might distinguish the two
oscillators. As with any symmetry, we are interested in the question of whether indistinguishable
systems are physically identical, so we have to understand clearly what can and cannot be distin-
guished. In the first place, given concrete oscillators we could simply dismantle them and place
their bobs on a scale to determine the masses, and thereby distinguish them. But this is not helpful
to our enquiry into T-duality, because there is no analogous experiment that could determine the
radius of space, only Brandenberger and Vafa’s equivocal experiment, and its ilk. If we thus don’t
have direct empirical access to constant, classical, c-number parameters like mass, radius (or spring
constant), then the question is whether duals can be distinguished by measurements of their dy-
namical, quantum observables. (Recalling our discussion of ‘observables’, we bear in mind that we
are assuming the measurability of all such quantities, not a just proper subset accessible to human
senses.)
For instance, the quantum harmonic oscillator energy spectrum is En = ~
√
k
m (n +
1
2 ), so
observations of the energy can determine the c-number k/m. But such measurements clearly cannot
determine whether 〈mass, spring constant〉 = 〈m, k〉 or 〈1/k, 1/m〉, since they agree on the ratio
of mass to spring constant. In general, measurements of observables that are invariant under a
duality will (obviously) not distinguish the duals. And some observables will be invariant: at least
the energy, since the Hamiltonian must be invariant to preserve the duality over time.
But not all. According to (7.8) x in one dual agrees with p in the other, not (in arbitrary
states) x in the other; and similarly for p and −x. The duality (like T-duality) does not assert
that both theories assign the same values to the same mathematical objects (operators and their
expectation values), but rather that they instantiate the same ‘pattern’ of values. For instance,
18We will generally say that position is dual to momentum and vice versa, although the sign change means that
this is not quite accurate. We will pay attention to the sign when it is significant.
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imagine a table of pairs of measured values at a series of times; if they agree with one oscillator’s
x and p expectation values at those times, then they equally agree with the expectation values of p
and −x, respectively, for the dual oscillator: at any time, the position of one is numerically equal
to the momentum of the other, and the momentum of the first to minus the position of the other.
The situation is exactly the same as for a string, in which the values of winding and momentum
are exchanged by T-duality, as we explained and as figure 2 illustrates. And similarly for other
dualities.
We agree with Weatherall (2019) that dualities are thus formally distinct from instances of
empirical equivalence as usually characterized.19 As in (7.6) and (7.8), a duality is an invariance
under a mapping between observables; a permutation of observables if the theories are self-dual
(as in T-duality), or a correspondence between distinct sets of observables if not (as in the ‘holo-
graphic’ duality discussed in §3.2). It is not simply an invariance of some quantities when others
are transformed or ‘translated’ to new values (though some observables will be preserved by a du-
ality). However, Weatherall’s approach does not adequately recognize how the issue of empirical
equivalence turns on the question of which quantities have independent physical significance, and
which obtain their significance through the dual theories themselves.
So suppose again that one is given the table of oscillator observation pairs: and suppose they
agree with the expectation values of x and p for some oscillator, hence for p and −x for its dual.
Applying the standard convention that x represents position and p momentum to both duals (so
adopting our Interpretation Two), knowledge of which column describes position measurements
and which momentum allows one to distinguish the dual oscillators. Once again, if 〈position,
momentum〉 = 〈i, j〉 for one dual, then 〈position, momentum〉 = 〈−j, i〉 for the other, and these
are generally unequal, since the oscillators move differently. This seems to be the normal case,
in which of course the dual oscillators are empirically distinguishable by position and momentum
measurements.
But the same pair of columns with no indication of which is position and which momentum, do
not distinguish the duals: 〈i, j〉 might represent 〈position, momentum〉 or 〈momentum, −position〉.
In the actual world, of course there would still be a fact about which column was really the result
of position measurements, and which momentum. The situation could only occur if, say, a careless
lab assistant neglected to label the columns when recording the data; though then the inability to
discern duals would only be epistemic. But what if the very meanings of ‘position’ and ‘momentum’
were called into question, raising the question of what exactly the two columns refer to?
This cannot happen in the normal case, because position and momentum are well-defined by
a theoretical and experimental framework independent of the harmonic oscillator: especially, their
general theoretical understanding in classical and quantum mechanics, the models of very many
other physical systems in which they are dynamical quantities, and the numerous techniques for
their measurement. For instance, dual oscillators can be distinguished by weighing their masses. Or
by coupling them to some external system that does not respect the duality, but depends directly
on the position: reflecting light off the bob, say. Or by ‘looking inside’ the oscillator in some other
way.
Calling into question the distinction between the dual quantities means ignoring all of that,
something that can only be done by supposing a world in which none of that framework surrounds
the oscillator, so a situation in which ‘position’ and ‘momentum’ are not ‘externally’ meaningful:
19We don’t agree with his suggestion that the duality literature misses this point (see footnote 17), though his
critique has prompted us to explain it more carefully. He uses the simple example of source-free electromagnetic
duality in much the way we and others have used the oscillator.
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in other words, a world in which there is nothing but a single oscillator. Then there is no weighing
or shining a light on the bob, since there are no scales or light; the difference between oscillator
position and momentum no longer makes a difference to other systems, because there are none. No
physical operations ‘look inside’ the oscillator.
Equation (7.7) can be taken to describe such a world. One then reflexively imports the usual
interpretations of ‘x’ and ‘p’ as position and momentum in the senses given by the actual world
framework. But then one discovers (7.8), and that the pattern of values for these quantities would
be the same under the opposite interpretations of ‘x’ and ‘p’. And so the question is which of these
two identifications of the quantities x and p is the correct one in the single oscillator world in which
(7.7) is the complete physical theory? Is the property of the lone oscillator denoted ‘x’ position or
momentum in our familiar sense? We argue that under the given circumstances there is no fact of
the matter: nothing internal to the oscillator world need determine how it instantiates the qualities
of our world.20 (Clearly our free choice of the symbol ‘x’ to label position in our world carries
no such ontological weight.) But that is to say, in theory terms, that the duals describe the same
world; that they are physically equivalent, that there is just no ‘inside’ to see.
Further, we argue, the case is just as in string theory, taken as a theory of everything. Consider
a world in which there is only a string in a spacetime with a closed dimension: now p (or n) and
w are the duals (7.6), in analogy to x and p for the oscillator. We know that dual systems agree
on the energy, and through the analysis of Brandenberger and Vafa, radius measurements. Such
measurements would in principle allow one to determine the values of all observables, including
momentum and winding. The issue is not the unobservability of momentum or winding, but rather
that of determining which measured quantity is position, and which is winding. That is, the duality
preserves the pattern of observables: some are invariant, and others permuted – if 〈n,w〉 = 〈i, j〉 in
one dual then 〈n,w〉 = 〈j, i〉 in the other. The pattern itself will not distinguish the duals, and there
is no broader theoretical framework in the lone string world to settle which value is n and which
w. By stipulation, there is no broader external theory in which strings with T-dual assignments of
n and w are not dual, allowing the duals to be distinguished. As with the oscillator, there is no
physical way to ‘look inside’ the system to see which dual it is. It seems that we should draw the
parallel conclusion: no preferred identification of the quantities with those of the actual world, and
no physical difference between the duals. That the duals describe the same world, and that there
is no ‘inside’ to see.
But what of the ‘low energy’ limit of the theory in which something like quantum particle physics
is found? In that framework particle momentum is well-defined, and observable. But the lesson
taught by Brandenberger and Vafa is that the state of a particle, or the measurement of that state
always have dual analysis: the state of a stringy particle can be understood equally well in terms of
the target space state of a string, or the dual winding space state; and any measurement of particle
momentum in terms of dual target and winding space processes. The measurement of the radius
of space is just one example of something general: low energy physics cannot break a duality, since
any ‘reduction’ has a dual, hooking up a single low energy structure to either of two dual high
energy structures.
We also want to head off the line of thought that we can just see – immediately experience – that
the radius of space is large, and that things would seem different if it were not. Brandenberger and
Vafa’s argument applies here. Given that our visual experiences supervene on the physical, whatever
20If you like, we advocate a kind of second-order antihaecceitism for qualities: dual worlds can’t differ simply in
how dual qualities are instantiated. We believe that such a view is compatible with Lewis’ nominalism, including
some version of his natural properties view, for instance.
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physical process that underwrites our experience of a large dimension is realized in both duals: in
one as a process involving momentum modes, say, and in the other involving winding modes. We
have been arguing that we should take these to be different representations of just one process,
but even on the view that counts them as distinct physical possibilities, a fairly mild assumption
will guarantee the indistinguishability of the duals even in direct experience. For the two processes
will only be experientially distinct if visual experiences depend on the processes grounding them
involving spatial (not winding modes): that T-dual brains are not identical minds. It is, in other
words to privilege the spatial in the physical theory of mind. But we see no particular motivation
for such a view: rejecting it means that dual brains have the same experiences, so that things would
not appear any different at all if target space had the reciprocal radius. Hence we cannot just ‘see’
which of the two possibilities holds, and considerations of direct experience provide no reason to
think that there are two physical possibilities at all.
We therefore conclude, in parallel with the lone oscillator, that in the lone string world there is no
fact of which of p and w is momentum and which is winding, and that the duals are thus physically
equivalent. Moreover, if string theory is understood as a theory of everything, then whether there
is one string or many makes no difference to the argument, and so we also conclude that T-duals
of full string theory are physically equivalent. Our conclusion is not a logical necessity, nor do we
think there are compulsory semantic or ontological principles that can force the conclusion that dual
theories of everything describe the same physical possibility. But the case of dual total theories is
clearly one in which the putative differences are ‘hidden’ in a very strong sense – a unique mass is
impossible to determine from the physical quantum quantities of the harmonic oscillator, just as a
rest frame is from relativistic quantities in special relativity. And when there are quantities that
do not supervene on any of the other physical quantities, and when there is no reason to think that
different values for them can be determined directly, then at least from a practical, scientific point
of view, it makes sense to treat those differences as non-physical (until some new, well-supported
theory shows how they are connected to physical quantities). In other words, long established,
well-motivated scientific reasoning should lead us to think that dual total theories represent the
same physical situation.
Of course one now wonders what physical equivalence under duality really amounts to. What
exactly is being claimed? Well, we have already described two interpretations of the claim in the
previous section. In §2.4 we will turn to the question of which we favor and why. Before that we
will discuss the general claim of equivalence of duals, and recent philosophical reflection on the
conclusion.
2.3 Interpretation: the meaning of physical equivalence
Our line of thought was presented in Huggett (2015) (Dieks et al. (2015) argue similarly), but
since then other authors have clarified or questioned the conclusion of physical equivalence.21 First,
de Haro (2020) (building on a series of earlier papers cited there, including that with Dieks et al.
just cited, and de Haro and Butterfield (2019)) develops this idea more formally and thoroughly.
Summarizing, in de Haro’s terms, dual oscillators are distinct because in our world, their common
core can (in a precise sense) be ‘extended’ to – embedded in – a larger theory that gives ‘external’
21Philosophers have focussed on the issue of physical equivalence, and the implications of the common core for
emergence, but Dawid (2017) emphasizes that string theorists have found duals a useful tool to gain different
perspectives on the underlying string theory. Indeed, he argues that this is their main significance; we agree with
the importance of the use he describes, but claim that quotienting is the important implication for understanding
the topic of this book – spacetime emergence.
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meaning to their terms: mass, spring constant, momentum, position. But in a world in which
the common core instead describes everything, then the duals are nothing but different tools for
computing the dynamics, with their differences (in m and k, and x and p) as nothing but empty
conventions used to turn the mathematical handle. In that case there would be no larger theory
of the world (without uninterpreted surplus structure) in which the core could be embedded; it is
‘unextendable’ to a more comprehensive theory, and hence cannot receive an external interpretation.
Instead it can only have an ‘internal’ interpretation: possible states are fully distinguished by the
value-pairs, have the same allowed histories, and are interpreted as the values of the only two
physical quantities of the world. As we noted above, we endorse this picture, but we think it
idealizes the situation: as we will discuss shortly, we need not have an explicit formulation of the
common core in order to know something of the shared physical content of duals.
Given de Haro’s framework, the question of physical equivalence has two parts. First, could
we ever reasonably believe that the common core of a pair of duals was not extendable? That
it captured all the physical structure of the world in its domain, so that it was not just part of
a broader (perhaps more fundamental) theory? Generally, unextendibility will not be a purely
formal property of a theory, but will depend on its intended application: real world oscillators
are extendable, but one can arguably stipulate a world in which they are not. So a typical way
to frame the question will be regarding its intended application to the actual world. Then one
may want to apply methodological principles such as ontological simplicity to move from duality
to unextendability, and thence to an internal interpretation. For instance, if the world constantly
manifests Lorentz symmetry, why postulate some unknown physics that picks out a rest frame?
Alternatively, de Haro suggests that physical principles of a theory will be used to answer the
question: perhaps in this case the Lorentz symmetry of the theories. But in a sense this approach
will also rest on methodological principles, for how else are we to decide the physical principles
themselves?
Second, suppose that the world were such that the common core of a pair of duals indeed has no
external interpretation: does it follow that the duals are physically equivalent? Perhaps instead they
could describe a pair of worlds in which different physical quantities are instantiated in isomorphic
patterns. This question will in part depend on considerations from philosophy of language: does
an interpretation of the core provide a relation between a single world and both duals, so they refer
to a single domain? De Haro shows that fairly mild assumptions about reference justify such a
conclusion. However, one might ask whether it is possible for there to be two interpretations of
the core, each relating the duals to different worlds. In such a case though, any one interpretation
of the common core will serve as an interpretation of the duals, since only the core has physical
significance. And so, de Haro points out, any one interpretation will relate all duals to the same
world. Hence, even if one interpretation is ‘better suited’ to the mathematical representation of
one dual than another, this will only be a pragmatic matter, not a semantic one that could produce
inequivalence.
Positive answers to both questions (Unextendable? Unequivocal internal interpretation?) for a
pair of duals means that they are physically equivalent, with their content exhausted by a single
internal interpretation of their core. It should be clear that such a conclusion, therefore, does
not follow simply from some formal property of theories, but is a matter of interpretation and
philosophical theory, something emphasized by Butterfield (forthcoming). However, some recent
commentators have raised substantive issues regarding physical equivalence, to which we would like
to respond.
Both Read and Møller-Nielsen (2018), and Butterfield (forthcoming) discuss significant cases
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resembling T-duality, in which a profound symmetry relates two theories, arguing that an inference
of physical equivalence is not thereby justified. For on more careful consideration, there is an impor-
tant difference between Lorentz invariance and T-duality, namely the knowledge of an underlying
formal structure which unifies different frames: a common core that makes explicit the unphysical
surplus structure introduced when a frame is chosen. (Unphysical in the sense that a convention is
involved, even though that convention will have to refer to physical objects to pick out an origin,
orientation, and so on.) In the case of T-duality there are just the duals, and no known explicit
common core; that would be ‘M-theory’, an exact completion of string theory (something that will
be a recurring topic in the remainder of this part of the book). Does this make a difference to
claims of equivalence? Read and Møller-Nielsen, and Butterfield think so. Consider the related ex-
ample of (full) Newtonian spacetime versus Galilean (or ‘neo-Newtonian’) spacetime (e.g., (Earman
1989, chapter 2)). Suppose one knew Galilean symmetric physics but only of Newtonian spacetime.
Would one be justified – just from Galilean symmetry – in inferring the physical equivalence of
two ‘theories’ that differed only in the standard of absolute rest? Or should one believe these to
be inequivalent states of affairs? (Or be agnostic?) Once one discovers Galilean spacetime it is
reasonable to take that to properly capture the geometry of spacetime, but until then? After all,
that is the analogue of the situation with string dualities.
It seems that everyone is agreed that things are not clear cut. But Butterfield says that inequiv-
alence is a reasonable option (§1.2); and Read and Møller-Nielsen say that inferring equivalence
is not justified (§3.3). While we think that although it is most reasonable to infer equivalence for
T-duals, we acknowledge that the point is open to debate, and others could judge differently. We do
not see the availability of an explicit formulation of the common core as particularly important for
inferring equivalence; we believe it to be cogent to assert that the physical content of duals is ‘that
which they say in common’, and argue that making explicit this common content is not necessary
in order to accept the assertion.22
In particular, our intuitions about the right thing to say about the Newtonian spacetime example
run in the opposite direction to Butterfield, Møller-Nielsen, and Read. They think that one would
best assume a standard of rest until Galilean spacetime is discovered; we think that one should
conclude that apparently different ascriptions of rest are in fact equivalent. (Which is not to say
that we fault Newton in historical context for accepting both absolute space and Galilean relativity;
we make our judgement from a historical perspective that has accumulated a great deal of additional
understanding of logic, semantics, mathematics, nature, and science.) And while agnosticism about
equivalence is the more epistemically cautious course, we don’t believe it to be more epistemically
virtuous for that. What we think is that global theories – such as Newtonian gravity – do have a good
track record for turning out to be unextendable, and that in particular string theory is promising
as a complete unified theory in its domain, and so is reasonably thought to be unextendable. And
from that we do think physical equivalence is the reasonable conclusion.
Of course, we agree that giving an explicit formulation of a common core is a significant goal
even when one has accepted physical equivalence; it would be an explicit formulation of the physical
content of the duals, and so crucial to fully understanding them. Indeed, the expected utility of
finding such an explicit core will (all things being equal) be greater the more likely one thinks
duals are equivalent; the more likely that is, the more likely it is that an explicit core exists. So
22There is a recent literature debating whether Ramsifying – here that ‘there are xs such that they satisfy the
common commitments of the duals’ – is reasonable. For instance, Dorr (2010) argues against this move in a number
of instances, while (Sider In progress, chapter 5) defends it (in some cases). We find that there are rather strong
intuitions on both sides; it is a topic we are happy to see being explored more carefully.
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we don’t find attractive Read and Møller-Nielsen’s (§3.3) ‘motivationalist’ position: that one is
most rational only to accept equivalence once an interpreted common core is known, and that one
should seek it. As we just explained, we find sufficient reasons to accept the equivalence of T-duals,
and that acceptance is (additional) motivation to seek the common core. Indeed, our discussion
of Brandenberger and Vafa, and our investigations in later chapters contribute to such a project.
As does (with impressive results) the work of de Haro and his collaborators (in addition to work
already cited, see Dieks et al. (2015); de Haro et al. (2016a,b); de Haro (2017)).
All that said, it may be surprising that we have some skepticism that the common core of
string duals can be formulated in a closed, complete formalism. The reason is that string theory as
currently formulated is an essentially perturbative theory: as we shall see in detail in the following
chapters, one postulates a classical limit of some as yet unknown theory, including a classical
spacetime, and then studies quantum perturbations around it. As such, it is not clear that there
will be some way of completely describing a shared core structure better than ‘that which the
duals have in common’; the duals themselves are inherently limited as descriptions of the world.
In this case, de Haro’s framework is just an idealization, as we suggested above. This situation is
compatible with finding out specific aspects of the common core, as we have just described, but
incompatible with stating a closed, complete interpretation. Instead, one hopes that the content of
the string duals will be found within a theory to which they are the perturbative approximations,
namely ‘M-theory’. (In addition to Read and Møller-Nielsen, and Butterfield, this point is stressed
as a motivation for studying duality by Le Bihan and Read (2018).) More than likely though,
M-theory contains both more and less content than either of the duals, and so is not the same as
simply quotienting them.
One might then ask what the value is of studying the duals, but this is a question we have
addressed a number of times: we are seeking to understand the fragments of existing quantum
theories for ways in which existing concepts of space and time might be modified in a successful
theory. So our attitude towards the investigation of duals has the same spirit. Moreover, the need
to interpret a perturbative quantum theory is nothing new; just the same policy has been fruitfully
pursued for quantum field theory (something defended in Wallace (2006, 2011)). However, we should
acknowledge that in chapter 9 the pertubative nature of the duals will limit our investigation.
2.4 Interpretation: factual or indeterminate geometry?
We will proceed on the understanding that T-dual theories describe the same physical situation.
The question now is what situation that is, in particular with respect to the geometry of space.
Above we described two possibilities: it could be that the duals agree that the radius of target
space is greater than `s, and the apparent inconsistency is resolved by understanding duality as a
permutation of terms, a relabeling. Or it could be that the duals should receive the same formal
interpretation, so that only their common pronouncements describe what is physical: for instance,
a unique radius to phenomenal, but not target, space. In this section we will make a couple of brief
comments on the two possibilities, and then explain why we favor the second.
Talking of ‘relabeling’ the terms of a theory may suggest that the difference is between passive
and active interpretations of duality. But that clearly isn’t correct: an active transformation links
two distinct states of affairs, but both interpretations agree that there is only one possibility, so
neither amounts to the view that T-duality is an active transformation. Moreover, T-duality cannot
be seen as a passive transformation in the sense that the duals are descriptions of a single situation
from two points of view, for the duality does not map ‘observers’ or concrete ‘reference frames’ into
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distinct but symmetrical observers and frames. And in the looser sense that both interpretations
take duals to be distinct representations of the same physical situation, both interpretations take a
duality to be equally ‘passive’.
In fact, the two interpretations that we have described are much closer to the interpretive
options that arise in the case of a gauge symmetry. On the one hand, maybe there is ‘one true
gauge’ (Healey 2001): in the present context, phenomenal space is identified with target space,
and has a definite radius R > `s. On the other, maybe apparent differences in choice of gauge
are nothing but differences in ‘surplus representational structure’ (Redhead 1975): target space is
distinguished from phenomenal space, and the difference between target spaces of radii R and `2s/R
is merely a difference in representational fluff. We won’t pursue this parallel to gauge symmetry in
field theory at length, but a couple of points are worth making. First, duality is neither a local nor
a continuous symmetry of the kind found in field theory, so much of the philosophical discussion
of those theories is inapplicable. Second, that said, at R = `s there is a continuous SU(2)×SU(2)
gauge symmetry of which T-duality is a part (e.g., Polchinski 1998, 247-8). Thus, in this sense at
least, T-duality is formally, and not just conceptually, a gauge symmetry.23
So, why do we advocate the indeterminate R interpretation? After all, the definite radius
view presented above is intuitive, in that it says that strings live in a space with an observed
radius R > `s; whether that space is called target or winding space. However, there is a distinct,
indistinguishable definite radius view according to which strings live in a space whose radius is
`2s/R; whether that space is labeled target or winding space! Generally, if there is one true gauge,
then there are as many distinct possibilities for it as choices of gauge: in this case two, depending
on the radius of the space in which the strings literally live, move and wind. According to one
choice, the space of experience is the one in which strings live, while according to the other the
space of experience is much bigger than the one in which they live: from Brandenberger and Vafa
we understand that the same appearances arise from a string’s momentum state in one dual, and
from its winding state in the other. The bottom line is that understanding T-duality as a mere
permutation of terms leaves open what underlying facts are equally described by the duals, because
such an understanding is compatible with different true gauges. Hence ‘Interpretation One’ does
not really address the issue it was supposed to resolve: dual theories are physically equivalent on
this interpretation, but there is a second pair of duals that differs physically from the first, but only
with respect to an unobservable radius. If one is satisfied with that situation, then why was one
not satisfied with physically inequivalent duals?
Moreover, these considerations point to an analogy to related cases in which we usually do
accept that there is no fact of some matter (we alluded to a similar example earlier). For instance,
one could claim that there is a preferred rest frame in spacetime, even though it has no physical
significance in special relativity. One could even claim that it is some frame which can be picked out
physically and phenomenally: for example, perhaps the fixed stars (idealized as an inertial frame)
are at rest. This proposals will strike most readers as completely unmotivated. But replace ‘frame’
with ‘radius’, and the fixed stars with the observed radius, and the parallel is perfect. Looked at
this way, the definite radius view appears as a reactionary attempt to preserve aspects of an old
theory when it is superseded, and understood as merely effective.
However, since Huggett (2015) we have recognized a way of defending a version of Interpretation
23See Healey (2007) and the responses to it for continuous gauge symmetries in general. The SU(2)×SU(2)
symmetry entails that an infinitesimal increase of the radius from R = `s is the same as an infinitesimal decrease.
Read (2014) makes a related comparison, but between string dualities and diffeomorphism symmetry rather than
conventional gauge symmetries.
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One that avoids these objections.24 Formally, the common formal core of T-duals (in our toy model)
is a pair of spaces, one big and one small. There is nothing indeterminate about the radii of the
bigger and of the smaller (R and 1/R, respectively, in `s = 1 units); and low energy phenomena
are understood in terms of states in the bigger, because it allows longer wavelength, lower energy,
wavefunctions. (In figure 2, delete ‘space’ and ‘winding space’, and the only difference between
the upper and lower figures is the trivial coordinate relabelling x ↔ y.) One could interpret the
duality as showing that there is no more physical content to the theory than this. Especially, as
showing that the distinctions between the terms ‘target space’ and ‘winding space’, and between
the related ‘momentum’ and ‘winding’ of the string, are without physical content. For as soon as
these have independent meaning, we can distinguish the two duals; even if we recognize them as
different descriptions of the same state of affairs. In short, this interpretation means that talking
of a ‘string’ in any classical spatial sense at all evaporates, because all one has is some quantum
object, described by a product of wavefunctions, one in each space.
One is of course then free to adopt the convention that ‘target space’ simply means ‘big space’,
and ‘winding space’ simply means ‘small space’, and that ‘momentum’ and ‘winding’ refer to wave-
functions in big and small space, respectively. That is to strip the terms of any of the physical
content with which they were introduced at the start of this chapter. So equally, one could have
adopted the opposite convention, and declared ‘winding space’ synonymous with ‘big space’. Either
way, these are just different terms one might choose for the same concept. Then one can preserve
Interpretation One, understanding the permutation of terms not as a choice of ‘true gauge’, but as
a mere linguistic convention. (Similarly, saying whether space is target space or not simply reports
the convention.) But adopting either convention adds nothing to the theory, since ‘big’ and ‘small’
would do just as well; their only significance is heuristic, as reminders of a certain way to derive
predictions.
In effect, this ‘two space’ interpretation extends the familiar idea (investigated in (Earman 1989,
chapter 3)) that the geometry of a spacetime should have the same symmetries as the physical laws:
in particular, if a spacetime has additional symmetry-breaking structure, it is preferable to find a
spacetime which ‘quotients’ it away. The proposed new formulation of string theory quotients away
the distinction between target and winding space, leaving only ‘big’ versus ‘small’ as physically
meaningful, so that the symmetries of the theoretical representation match those of the dynamical
physical quantities. It agrees that space is not target space, if ‘target space’ is supposed to denote
something more than ‘big space’. But it does not admit three distinct spaces, since space is not
emergent, but identified with the larger of the two string spaces: the one to which we refer spatial
phenomena.
While we endorse Earman’s prescription in general, and find this interpretation appealing, we
do not think that it is the correct account of string dualities. The simple quotienting in this case
is an artifact of the particular formulation and duality. Our ‘double field’ approximation leads to
two spaces with interchangeable roles, whose initial difference can then be ignored. But in other
dualities, introduced in §3, things are not so simple, and a quotiented formulation in which space
is clearly identifiable is not available: dimensionality or other global topology changes, or weak
couplings are exchanged with strong ones, or even the elementary with the composite. But without
such a common core, with a structure identifiable as space, the approach breaks down.25 Then, on
the one hand, parity of cases implies that T-duality is correctly understood in the same way; on
24We are especially grateful to Neil Dewar for a useful discussion of the following.
25We want to thank Keizo Matsubara for emphasizing especially this point to NH in their many discussions about
duality.
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the other, insofar as we are taking our toy model of T-duality as a model of all dualities, we need
to interpret it the same way (regardless of whether that is correct for the case in hand).
Even in the case of T-duality in a realistic perturbative string theory (as opposed to our toy
system), formally a string will live in three large spatial dimensions plus six or 22 microscopic
dimensions (plus time); and from the worldsheet perspective, momentum and winding will corre-
spond to distinct sets of quantum field excitations. The microscopic dimensions are beyond normal
observation, but are still ‘big’ on the string scale (r  `S), so larger than winding space; however
small enough that that at energies low on the string scale, both momentum and winding will con-
tribute to string processes. The model we have worked with collapses all this structure into a pair
of wavefunctions, but once it is put back, it is not clear even in this perturbative case how the
quotienting strategy can be applied. We will return to this question briefly in §3.1, when we will
see that open string duality makes this simple quotienting even less satisfactory.
In other words, while we agree that the proposed two space interpretation is reasonable for a
system in which our double field model is the exact, complete description (as we treated it in com-
parison with the harmonic oscillator), when it comes to interpreting string theory we have to bear in
mind that the model is an approximation. The proposed quotient depends on that approximation
and, we argue, does not apply to string theory more fully; hence the two space interpretation is not
a viable account of string theory. For string theory then, we endorse Interpretation Two instead.
That is, target space (like winding space) has a radius indeterminate between R and 1/R, and so
cannot be identified with classical space, which has a determinate radius of R – in other words,
space is emergent.
3 Beyond closed string T-duality
This chapter focusses on the technically simplest example of string duality, but we should briefly
survey the other important cases. The philosophical issues that arise are – we claim – the same as
for closed string T-duality, though because questions of equivalence are not separable from questions
of interpretation, the conclusions need not be the same (though we are inclined to say they are).
Here, however, we just focus on sketching the relevant formal ideas, and leave aside such questions.
Below we will discuss T-duality for open strings (§3.1), which must be treated differently to
closed strings, since they cannot enclose a dimension; and the ‘holographic’ duality between strings
in a gravitational field and a gauge field on the boundary of spacetime (§3.2). Brief as those treat-
ments are, two other dualities will only be mentioned in passing (introductions and investigations
can be found in Rickles (2011a)).
First there is ‘mirror symmetry’, which states the equivalence target spaces of different topolo-
gies. More specifically, this equivalence holds for supersymmetric strings, which we saw live in
a 10-dimensional target space. If it takes the form of 4-dimensional Minkowski space, plus 6-
dimensional closed ‘compact’ dimensions (as one might model our universe), then mirror symmetry
holds between specific pairs of compact dimensions of different topologies. Insofar as these are taken
to literally represent space then according to our preceding analysis there is no fact of the matter of
the ‘shape’ of space. (Though one could argue instead, with Matsubara and Johansson (2018), that
that such indeterminacy sometimes indicates that the compact dimensions are not spatial at all,
but rather represent internal degrees of freedom.) While our conclusion that space has no definite
classical topology is even more conceptually dramatic than our earlier one that spaces of definite
topology have no determinate radius, mirror symmetry is in fact a mathematical generalization of
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T-duality (Strominger et al. (1996)). Mirror symmetry is especially interesting because its discovery
sparked much of the initial excitement about dualities when it was used to simplify and solve some
difficult mathematical problems.
Second, there is ‘S-duality’, which also has applications in mathematics. This relates different
‘types’ of superstring theory, characterized by their different boundary conditions. In this regard
S-duality is analogous to open string T-duality, to which we will shortly turn. However, it is
also characterized by exchanging strong and weak values for the string coupling strength: for
instance, Type I string theory with a strong coupling is dual to SO(32) type with weak coupling
(while Type IIB has a self-duality between strong and weak couplings). S-duality has been less
discussed by philosophers, but is thought significant for providing an important clue that the
different supersymmetric string types are different perturbations of a single underlying, M-theory.26
3.1 T-Duality for open strings
On the face of things, it is hard to see how T-duality could be extended to open strings. The
winding number of a closed string is conserved classically or in the absence of string interactions
because the topology of target space prevents the string from being contracted to a smaller winding
number. But an open string can (topologically) always be contracted to a point, in any space, so
does not seem to have a winding number. But in that case, one cannot exchange momentum and
winding, and (7.6) does not seem to apply at all. (Or if you prefer, w is always zero, so T-duality
must fail for non-zero momentum.) However, T-duality does apply to open strings, in a surprising
and very important way, which illuminates the physical content of the theory. We cannot see this
at the level of the toy double field approximation we have used so far, but need to draw on the
theory developed in chapter 6.
First we will work out how to implement T-duality for closed strings in those terms, and then
we apply the transformations to the open string.27 We start again with the equation for a string
wound around a closed dimension (7.1), ignoring the vibrational part for simplicity for now; what
follows can readily be seen to hold for that part too.
X(τ, σ) = 2`2spτ + 2Rwσ = 2`
2
snτ/R+ 2Rwσ, (7.9)
using p = k = n/R (since ~ = 1). Next we expand this into left and right moving pieces:
X = (τ + σ) · (`
2
sn
R
+Rw) + (τ − σ) · (`
2
sn
R
−Rw) ≡ XL(τ, σ) +XR(τ, σ). (7.10)
We observe now that if we take the rescaled reciprocal radius, R→ `2S/R, then:
XL → (τ + σ) · (
`2sw
R
+Rn)
XR → −(τ − σ) · (
`2sw
R
−Rn), (7.11)
26Other interesting dualities, and some profound insights into the nature of duality in general can be found in
Polchinski (2017). Especially, he discusses elementary-composite duality, also investigated by Castellani (2017).
27The following treatment follows Polchinski (1998, §8.3, 6), (Becker et al. 2006, §6.1), and (Zwiebach 2004,
chapters 17-18).
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so that if one also interchanges w ↔ n, then XL → XL and XR → −XR. Then summing the
transformed left and right moving parts, we find:
X → 2Rwτ + 2`2Snσ/R. (7.12)
Comparing this expression with (7.9), paying attention to the timelike and spacelike coordinates,
we see that it describes a closed string with wavenumber w and winding number n, but in a target
space of radius `2S/R. That is of course what we expected from our previous quantum analysis, (7.6).
In other words, in this formalism we implement closed string T-duality with the transformation:
XL → XL and XR → −XR. (7.13)
We postulate that the transformation remains unchanged for the open string.
So we start with the general equation of motion for the open string (6.9) (recalling footnote 2):
X = 2`2snτ/R+ i
√
2`s
∑
j 6=0
1
j
αje
−ijτ cos 2jσ (7.14)
For the open string it is illuminating to leave in the part of the solution describing vibrations, as
we shall see. Break this into left and right moving parts, X = XL +XR,
XL =
`2sn(τ + σ)
R
+
i`s√
2
∑
j 6=0
1
j
αje
−ijτe−i2jσ
XR =
`2sn(τ − σ)
R
+
i`s√
2
∑
j 6=0
1
j
αje
−ijτe+i2jσ, (7.15)
and apply our T-duality transformation (7.13) to obtain the dual state:
XL −XR = 2`2snσ/R+
√
2`s
∑
j 6=0
1
j
αje
−ijτ sin 2jσ. (7.16)
What does this T-dual state represent?
First, we notice that there is no term linear in the time, so no overall linear motion; all the string’s
motion is vibrational. But if there is no linear momentum term, what does n now represent? As
in (7.12), the term linear in σ has the correct form for a string wound n times around a space of
radius `2S/R. But how can an open string have a meaningful winding number? To answer this
question, consider the ends of the string, σ = 0, π. Because of the sin 2jσ term, they have no time
dependence at all – they are fixed in space! (Or rather, they are fixed in the dimension in question.)
That is, they satisfy the Dirichlet boundary conditions that we noticed in (6.21). So that is why
an open string can have a sensible winding number: if its end are attached to something, it can no
longer be topologically shrunk to a point! So the physical interpretation is that the state T-dual
to a freely moving open string in a space radius R, is an open string wound around a space of
reciprocal radius, but with its ends fixed in place. (And it’s easy to see that the ends will be a
distance 2`2Sπ/R apart.) Of course, one has to check that the transformation really is a duality, that
these two very different strings do agree on expectation (values under the duality), as for closed
string. But they do (as you can see in the references in footnote 27).
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In a sense then, by allowing Dirichlet boundary conditions, the string theory we developed in
the previous chapter already contained room for open string T-duality; we didn’t have to extend the
formalism. But of course, in a very important way something very new has just been discovered; for
what are the ends attached to? The reason we didn’t pursue Dirichlet boundary conditions to start
with is that they involve invariant locations, and so violate Poincaré invariance (and momentum
conservation at the ends of the string). But there is another possibility. Suppose that a more
complete theory, to which our perturbative string theory approximates, contains other dynamical
(properly relativistic) objects than strings; specifically multi-dimensional generalizations of strings,
known as p-branes. And suppose further that open strings can attach to them, enforcing Dirichlet
boundary conditions: that they are ‘Dp-branes’.28 And even further that they are non-perturbative:
the approximations on which perturbative string theory is based, means that they do not appear as
dynamical objects in the theory. If so, then open string T-duality simply shows that perturbative
string theory is not completely independent of Dp-branes, but recognizes their physical presence,
at the level of non-dynamical objects.
In that case, one would very much like to know whether more can be discovered about Dp-
branes at the perturbative level, and of course this question has been extensively studied.29 Those
results fall outside the scope of this work, but it is worth noting that the gauge fields that arise in
superstring theory naturally couple to ‘charges’ carried by p-branes. In other words, their presence
is revealed in perturbative string theory in more ways than through T-duality. Moreover, this role
opens the door to a great deal of very interesting (and physically realistic) physics.
We promised above to apply these considerations to the question of whether T-dual theories
could be realistically quotiented by a pair of wavefunctions. The presence of Dp-branes as physical
objects, makes this proposal even less realistic since they are not described in the two field ap-
proximation we used above. The pair of wavefunctions carry no information about branes or their
locations; indeed, any quotient would have to be the same regardless of the presence or absence
of branes, so insensitive to them in that sense. What one expects instead is that the duals are
‘quotiented’ by an underlying theory, in which spacetime concepts do not fully apply; but which
can equally be approximated with and without branes, or by any pair of dual theories. But at
the level of perturbation theory, around a spacetime solution, we have to give significance to spa-
tiotemporal concepts; that they are artifacts of an approximation scheme leads to their surprising
indeterminacy.
3.2 Gauge-gravity duality
In the early 21st century, perhaps the most important tool for the study of string theory has
been what is variously known as ‘AdS-CFT duality’ (an acronym of ‘Anti de Sitter-conformal field
theory’), or ‘gauge-gravity duality’ (the gauge theory being the CFT, and the gravity theory AdS
space), or ‘holographic duality’ (though strictly this is a more general concept). This duality was
proposed by Maldacena, whose argument we will briefly discuss. But it has its roots in an earlier
proposal by ’t Hooft (Stephens et al. 1994) based on the observation that the entropy of a black hole
is proportional to its area not volume, suggesting that the entropy counts states on the ‘boundary’
28Where ‘D’ is for ‘Dirichlet’, and p is the dimensionality of the brane. 0 ≥ p ≥ D (the dimension of space); and,
if you think about it, if the end of the string is attached to a brane, then it is fixed in D− p dimensions, and free to
move in p of them. For instance, a point attached to the z-axis in 3-space can only move in one dimension, and is
fixed in the x-y-plane.
29For a sense of their physical significance, refer to the references of footnote 27. For philosophical discussion of
their nature see Vistarini (2017) and Vistarini (2019, chapter 4).
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not ‘bulk’. In other words, suggesting that the full state of the black hole can be described by
microstates on its horizon. Of course, for appropriate densities of states it’s always possible to
match the number of states on bulk and boundary; but the point is that for a constant quantized
state density the number of states will not remain equal – doubling the radius means 4 × the
boundary states but 8 × the bulk states. So the idea that bulk and boundary of any system can
be physically equivalent – dual – is remarkable: but it seems to be the case when one compares a
theory of gravity in AdS space, with a conformal gauge field on its boundary.
Maldacena’s argument (Maldacena (1998))30 rests on the string theoretic understanding of gauge
fields on the one hand, and of gravity and curved spacetime on the other. First then, gauge quanta
can be understood in terms of the modes of open strings whose ends are attached to coincident
Dp-branes. Specifically, if there are N such branes then the ground states of (supersymmetric)
strings connecting them will describe the quanta of an SU(N) Yang-Mills gauge field – just as in
the previous chapter we understood the quanta of bosonic fields as modes of bosonic strings when
viewed ‘close up’.31 Moreover, the branes and strings will carry charge for this gauge field. Second,
we know that string modes have mass because of their tension, and the same applies to branes.
Then the energy-momentum of the gauge field, its charges, and of the string and brane masses will
provide a source for a relativistic gravitational field: the matter side of the Einstein field equation.32
In other words both the gauge field on the boundary and gravity in the bulk can both be
understood in string terms if one focusses in to small enough scales; and AdS-CFT duality ultimately
asserts the equivalence of apparently very different systems of strings. Maldacena’s argumentative
strategy for this duality was to compare a system at weak and strong string couplings; observe that
a low energy equivalence holds for half of it; and conjecture (on the basis of additional evidence)
that the equivalence also holds for the other half: a gauge theory at weak coupling and AdS at
strong. (Note that the string coupling is a dynamic quantity, not a constant of nature, and so really
will vary.)
In slightly more detail: the system in question consists of closed superstrings, and N coincident
D3-branes with attached open superstrings, all in flat 10-dimensional spacetime. For weak coupling:
there are no interactions between the strings, so the systems decouple; moreover, gravity is ‘turned
off’, and so spacetime is flat; and finally, at low energy the open strings will be unexcited, massless
quanta of an SU(N) gauge field. For strong coupling: gravity is now ‘turned on’, and spacetime
will be curved by the energy and charge of the D3-branes; near the branes the geometry will AdS5
(from the 4 spacetime dimensions parallel to the branes plus the radial dimension) times S5 from
the remaining dimensions; far from the branes the geometry will be flat; then plausibly the closed
strings near the branes do not interact with those far away, leaving (at low energy) a stringy
gravitational field in AdS5 × S5 and again closed strings in flat spacetime. The coincidence of the
closed string part of the system at weak and strong couplings then supports the idea that the other
part of the system – a gauge theory at weak coupling, and AdS5 × S5 gravity at strong – also
coincides, so that these theories are equivalent, or rather dual.
There has been considerable philosophical discussion of AdS-CFT33; we have treated the general
30See (Zwiebach 2004, chapter 23) or Dawid (2017) for intuitive presentations.
31More carefully, they are quanta of a U(N) field, which decouples into SU(N) plus a single gauge field.
32In the next chapter we will explicate the nature of gravity in string theory in detail. Ultimately the curved
geometry is understood in terms of graviton states of the string, so that instead of sourcing an extrinsic gravitational
field (as it seems here), matter and gravitational fields are both states of strings; the theory of gravity is a theory of
string-string interaction.
33A good cross-section is: de Haro et al. (2016a,b); de Haro (2017); Matsubara (2013); Polchinski (2017); Read
(2014); Rickles (2012); Teh (2013); Vistarini (2017, 2019).
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philosophical consequences of duality in terms of T-duality instead, and a discussion of the more
specific features of AdS-CFT is largely beyond the scope of this work. However, we want to
recommend an essay by Harlow (2020) which presents a simple but illuminating and contentful
model of AdS-CFT duality, in which the bulk contains a black hole. Briefly, three ‘qutrits’34 live
on the boundary, comprising a 33 = 27-dimensional Hilbert space of a boundary quantum theory.
The bulk theory is represented by a single qutrit, living in a 3-dimensional subspace of the full
theory; corresponding to the few degrees of freedom of a classical black hole. But the bulk theory
should be dual to that on the boundary, and so also live in a 27-dimensional Hilbert space; what
has happened to the other 24 dimensions? Harlow’s point is that although both bulk and boundary
theories are effective descriptions of more fundamental string states, the boundary quantum gauge
theory is still more fundamental – closer to string theory – than the bulk classical theory. When one
recognizes that point it is natural to understand the missing 24 dimensions as representing quantum
microstates of the black hole. If so, AdS-CFT duality allows one to study the unknown quantum
nature of black holes through the better understood physics of CFT. Harlow’s work explores and
supports this very idea.
He emphasizes that this picture also clarifies the common view that AdS-CFT duality asserts
the equivalence of the two theories. This view is correct at the level of the fundamental string
description, but not at the level of the effective AdS and effective CFT descriptions, for the latter is
a more complete description than the former; as we just saw, it carries more information about the
fundamental string state. In that sense, the classical AdS theory is not equivalent to the quantum
CFT, but derived from it; then as we saw, the additional boundary degrees of freedom allow one to
probe quantum gravity in the bulk. Moreover, this is a picture in which not all quantum degrees
of freedom correspond to classical spacetime degrees of freedom, suggesting – with Brandenberger
and Vafa – that the fundamental ones may not be spatiotemporal at all.35
4 Conclusions
The main conclusions of this chapter are as follows. First, T-duality is an unusually deep symmetry
between theories, with respect to some very counterintuitive and surprising parameters: especially
the radius of space. Gauge symmetries in field theory are similarly deep, but since they typically
involve internal degrees of freedom, they are not so shocking. A touchstone of this chapter has been
the analysis of Brandenberger and Vafa, which explains how there can be two theories apparently
differing on the radius of space, yet predicting the same observed radius. Their analysis has helped
at several points to understand the physical meaning of T-duality: such a picture is crucial to
understanding duality.
The symmetry is so deep – between all observables, not just empirical quantities in some superfi-
cial sense – that duals should be understood as giving physically equivalent descriptions. Since they
formally disagree on some claims, we have argued (against an alternative view) that the physical
commitments of dual theories are limited to their common consequences. Specifically, they disagree
on the radius of target space, so that must be indeterminate between the two possible values. And
in general, ‘target space’ is not a space in the familiar sense at all, but a ‘space’ with only the
34A qutrit is the 3-dimensional generalization of an ordinary (2-dimensional) qubit.
35See Mathur (2012) for an introduction to the ‘fuzzball’ approach to string theoretic black holes, which proposes
a specific quantum structure (and Huggett and Matsubara (2020) for further philosophical analysis). In a fuzzball
model spacetime indeed ‘ends’ at the horizon, leaving the black hole state ‘beyond spacetime’.
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structures on which the duals agree. (Quite possibly then, a structure that appears as a formal
representation of some more fundamental, as yet unknown, non-spatial object.) As the analysis
of Brandenberger and Vafa explains, duals do agree on the radius of phenomenal space, so that is
determinate. But nothing can be both determinate and indeterminate with respect to radius, and
so target space is not classical, relativistic space.
Therefore classical space, specifically as a geometric space of determinate radius, is not a funda-
mental object of string theory, but an appearance, arising from physical processes of the kind that
Brandenberger and Vafa analyzed. That, ultimately, is the ontological significance of T-duality,
and indeed of the other dualities we have described.
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Hrvoje Nikolić. Bohmian mechanics in relativistic quantum mechanics, quantum field theory and
string theory. Journal of Physics: Conference Series, 67(012035):1–6, 2007.
Joseph Polchinski. Dualities of fields and strings. Studies in History and Philoso-
phy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 59:6 –
20, 2017. ISSN 1355-2198. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.08.011. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219815000829. Dualities in
Physics.
Joseph Gerard Polchinski. String theory. Cambridge university press, 1998.
James Read. The interpretation of string-theoretic dualities, December 2014. URL
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11205/.
James Read and Thomas Møller-Nielsen. Motivating dualities. Synthese, pages 1–29, 2018.
M. L. G. Redhead. Symmetry in intertheory relations. Synthese, 32(1-2):77–112, 1975.
Dean Rickles. A philosopher looks at string dualities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 42(1):54–67, 2011a.
Dean Rickles. A philosopher looks at string dualities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Part B, 42(1):54–67, 2011b.
Dean Rickles. Ads/cft duality and the emergence of spacetime. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2012.
Dean Rickles. Mirror symmetry and other miracles in superstring theory. Foundations of Physics,
43(1):54–80, 2013.
Theodore Sider. The tools of metaphysics and the metaphysics of science. In progress.
C R Stephens, G ’t Hooft, and B F Whiting. Black hole evaporation without information loss.
Classical and Quantum Gravity, 11(3):621–647, Mar 1994. ISSN 1361-6382. doi: 10.1088/0264-
9381/11/3/014. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0264-9381/11/3/014.
31
Andrew Strominger, Shing-Tung Yau, and Eric Zaslow. Mirror symmetry is t-duality. Nuclear
Physics B, 479(1-2):243–259, Nov 1996. ISSN 0550-3213. doi: 10.1016/0550-3213(96)00434-8.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0550-3213(96)00434-8.
Nicholas J. Teh. Holography and emergence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 44(3):300–311, 2013.
Bas C van Fraassen. The scientific image. Oxford University Press, 1980.
Tiziana Vistarini. Holographic space and time: Emergent in what sense? Studies in His-
tory and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,
59:126 – 135, 2017. ISSN 1355-2198. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2016.07.002.
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219816301137. Dualities
in Physics.
Tiziana Vistarini. The Emergence of Spacetime in String Theory. Routledge, 2019.
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